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SAVINGS CLAUSES AND TRENDS IN NATURAL
RESOURCES FEDERALISM
ROBERT L. FISCHMAN* & ANGELA M. KING**

INTRODUCTION
Federalism is both ubiquitous and essential in natural resources
law. Power-sharing arrangements are part of the organic legislation for all
of the federal land systems except the national parks.1 They are key elements in the exercise of regulatory authority as well. Because private land
use control is the last outpost of near-exclusive state/local jurisdiction, the
federal government needs state partners to achieve any federal objective
where controlling soil disturbance is key. Even the traditional proprietary
functions of natural resources law increasingly aspire to ecosystem management. Because ecosystems cross federal land boundaries, cooperative
arrangements have become more central to public land law. Although less
strong than land use control, pervasive state management of water and
wildlife also means that state cooperation is vital for achieving most federal objectives regarding those resources. Land, water, and wildlife concerns encompass all of the great resource disputes that federal natural
resources law seeks to resolve.
Federalism is to environmental law what scope of review is to administrative law: a pervasive, indispensable doctrine defined concisely in ways
that give little insight into how it actually works. It takes five minutes to
*

Professor, Indiana University School of Law—Bloomington. Thanks to Lloyd Dorsey, Rob
Glicksman, Sid Shapiro, and Sandi Zellmer for helpful suggestions. Mark Rohr provided
excellent research assistance. I am also grateful to Mark Squillace for inviting me to explore
this subject for the University of Colorado Natural Resources Law Center’s Twenty-Fifth
Anniversary Conference. The Indiana University School of Law generously supported
this work.
**
J.D. Candidate, 2008, Indiana University School of Law—Bloomington.
1
See National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (2000) (requiring the Secretary
of Agriculture to coordinate with the natural resources “planning processes of State and
local governments”); Federal Land Policy Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c) (9) (2000)
(requiring the Bureau of Land Management to coordinate with state and local governments
in the development of land use plans “to the extent consistent with the laws governing the
administration of the public lands”); National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act,
16 U.S.C. § 668dd(e)(1)(A)(iii) (2000) (requiring that federal long-range plans for wildlife
refuges be consistent with state wildlife conservation plans “to the extent practicable”).
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explain federalism but a lifetime to understand its dynamic on the ground.
We begin with a case study illustrating the operation of cooperative
federalism and proceed to a more abstract doctrinal analysis of statutory
savings clauses. Fealty to subsidiarity and respect for states’ interests
are universally expressed values. In practice, however, the substantive
preference of a state has as much to do with the weight federal agencies
will afford it as does the legal or policy framework for a particular resource. Therefore, it is important to leaven the parsing of statutes and
judicial opinions with a review of the trajectory of federal administrative
initiatives involving state, tribal, and local partners.
Compared to pollution control, resource management federalism
involves greater site-specific variation and more discretionary disparities.2
This Article builds on prior work exploring federalism in natural resources
law to understand how courts interpret the broad congressional directives
on the states’ role in resource management. Although commentary abounds
on particular components of federalism policy, especially place-based collaboration, there exists little scholarship constructing a framework for
understanding the kinds of federalism operating in natural resources law.
This Article concentrates on the descriptive challenge of cataloging the
federalism dynamic, particularly in public land management.
This Article begins, in Part I, with the controversy over managing
elk in the Jackson Hole area of Wyoming. Few current disputes better illustrate the federalism dynamic in public land and wildlife management. The
elk controversy shows how a statutory savings clause can provide a state
with traction to advance its interests and demonstrates how the political
winds of change can shift the balance of state-federal relations.
Part II reviews the distinctive kinds of federalism found in natural
resources law and highlights how they differ from the pollution-control
style of federalism. Part III focuses on the common statutory savings
clauses that establish the broad scope of federal arrangements. It describes
their roles in circumscribing federal agency authority and establishing a
basis for cooperation between the federal and state governments. Part IV
then analyzes the interpretive approaches courts may employ to make
sense of the statutory savings language. Part V highlights recent trends
that set the direction for policy innovations in natural resources federalism
and muses on the future of federalism in natural resources law.

2

See Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 179, 180-81 (2005).
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FEDERALISM AT THE NATIONAL ELK REFUGE

Some of the largest concentrations of elk in North America occur in
Jackson Hole, Wyoming.3 Jackson Hole is a valley of the upper Snake River
approximately forty miles long and ten miles wide.4 Federal lands dominate the landscape: the Bridger-Teton National Forest, Caribou-Targhee
National Forest, Grand Teton National Park (“GTNP”), Yellowstone
National Park, the National Elk Refuge (“NER”), and the Gros Ventre
Wilderness together constitute ninety-seven percent of the Jackson Hole
area.5 In the private enclave of Jackson, Wyoming, the traditional dominance of the ranching economy has given way to tourism, which is dependent on the recreational resources of the surrounding public lands. Despite
their relatively small area, the private lands of Jackson Hole have experienced a six-fold increase in year round population between 1960 and 2000.
Tourism fuels over fifty-five percent of the jobs in Jackson Hole. From
1997 to 2001 expenditures by nonresident hunters alone generated over
250 jobs and four million dollars of personal income.6
The Jackson Hole elk herd’s size has averaged 14,600 over the past
several years, but is currently closer to 13,000.7 Approximately 7,000 elk
winter on the NER.8 In 2007, the Interior Department completed an
Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) to decide how many elk (and
bison) the NER and GTNP should support and what management tools
ought to ensure the health of the herd.9 In particular, the EIS deals with
the winter feeding of elk, which sustains the high populations but causes
a host of ecological problems.10 This recent study caps nearly a century
of intensive efforts to maintain elk, sometimes with the federal and state
government agencies locking horns.11 It responds both to court orders and

3

U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L PARK SERV., FINAL BISON AND ELK MANAGEMENT
PLAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 3 (2007) [hereinafter FEIS], available at
http://www.fws.gov/bisonandelkplan/Final%20Bison%20and%20Elk%20Management
%20Plan%20and%20Environmental%20Impact%20Statement.htm.
4
John Daugherty, A Place Called Jackson Hole: A Historic Resource Study of Grand Teton
National Park (1999), available at http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/grte2/
hrs.htm.
5
See FEIS, supra note 3, at 177.
6
Id. at 177-78, 182.
7
Id. at iii.
8
Id. at 123.
9
See generally id. at 1-600 (providing a complete copy of the EIS).
10
Id. at 9-10.
11
Id. at 6.
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to significant revisions of refuge administration law and park management
policies. The dispute over the size and management of the elk herd that
winters in the NER specifically, and Jackson Hole generally, illustrates
many of the conceptual points developed in the subsequent parts of this
Article.
Elk herds summer in the high country of GTNP, southern
Yellowstone National Park, and surrounding national forests. The herds
migrate to winter habitat when temperatures decrease and snow accumulates in late fall. Settlement and development over the past 125 years
deprived the herds of many migration routes and some of their historic
winter range. Originally, elk herds passed through Jackson Hole on their
way south to the Green River Basin or the Red Desert area of Wyoming.12
But, ranched livestock consumed forage in the valley, while roads and
fences disrupted migration paths. Unable to complete the journey to their
historic winter habitat, elk began wintering in Jackson Hole.13 Therefore,
one of the chief limiting factors on the elk population of the area is the
confined winter range’s carrying capacity.14
Wyoming has a distinctive tradition of augmenting the carrying
capacity through winter feeding that began at Jackson Hole.15 As elk populations hit historic lows in the late 1800s and early 1900s, Jackson residents sought to protect them from “tusk hunters” and commercial hunting
operations.16 At the same time, a series of severe winters, combined with
the conversion of open range to ranching, resulted in conflicts with livestock operations and left substantial numbers of elk dead. Local citizens
and organizations, as well as state and federal officials, began winter
feeding in 1910-11 to reduce mortality rates and minimize the damage
to ranchers’ hay. In 1912, Congress provided money for the purchase of
a winter range for the 20,000 elk wintering in the area. This area became
the National Elk Refuge.17
12

Id. at 121. See generally Christina M. Cromley, Historic Elk Migrations Around Jackson
Hole, Wyoming, in BULLETIN SERIES NO. 104, YALE SCHOOL OF FORESTRY AND ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES, DEVELOPING SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT POLICY FOR THE NATIONAL ELK
REFUGE, WYOMING 53, 53 (Tim W. Clark, Denise Casey & Anders Halverson eds., 2000),
available at http://environment.yale.edu/documents/downloads/0-9/104Cromelk.pdf.
13
Cromley, supra note 12, at 53; FEIS, supra note 3, at 121, 171.
14
FEIS, supra note 3, at 121.
15
Hal Herring, Predator Hunters for the Environment, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, June 25, 2007.
16
FEIS, supra note 3, at 121.
17
Id. at 6, 123. The NER was the first unit of the system to be called a “refuge.” ROBERT
L. FISCHMAN, THE NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGES: COORDINATING A CONSERVATION SYSTEM
THROUGH LAW 168 (2003).
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Since its creation, NER management focused on elk and other game
species. Although the elk provided the original rationale for creating the
NER, the refuge is much more than just a feeding ground for elk. Two endangered species, the gray wolf and whooping crane, as well as a significant
bison herd, occupy the refuge.18 Overall, the NER supports 178 bird species,
49 mammal species, 382 vascular plant species, and five fish species.19 But,
elk out-compete other animals for both management attention and food.
The herds degrade plant communities, contributing to biodiversity loss
in the refuge.20 For instance, elk over-browse woody vegetation, thereby
reducing valuable habitat for trout and many bird species.21
The 1997 organic legislation for the refuge system added biological
integrity, diversity, and environmental health to the list of management
objectives22 and expanded the scope of concern from wildlife to include
plants as well.23 Yet, in 1998, approximately 8,500 elk wintered on the
refuge. This is substantially larger than the natural carrying capacity of
5,500 elk, as estimated by pioneering wildlife biologist Olaus Murie.24 Consequently, conservation groups became increasingly worried about concentrating too many elk in too small an area in Jackson Hole to the detriment
of other species and with increased risk of disease to the elk.25

18

See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Threatened and Endangered Species on National
Wildlife Refuges Database, http://www.fws.gov/refuges/databases/threatenedendangered
species/State_Display.cfm (last visited Nov. 5, 2007).
19
Noah Matson, Biodiversity and Its Management on the National Elk Refuge, Wyoming,
in BULLETIN SERIES NO. 104, YALE SCHOOL OF FORESTRY AND ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES,
DEVELOPING SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT POLICY FOR THE NATIONAL ELK REFUGE, WYOMING
101, 101 (Tim W. Clark, Denise Casey & Anders Halverson eds., 2000), available at http://
environment.yale.edu/documents/downloads/0-9/104Matson.pdf.
20
Tim W. Clark, Wildlife Resources: The Elk of Jackson Hole, Wyoming, in BULLETIN
SERIES NO. 104, YALE SCHOOL OF FORESTRY AND ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES, DEVELOPING
SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT POLICY FOR THE NATIONAL ELK REFUGE, WYOMING 171, 172
(Tim W. Clark, Denise Casey & Anders Halverson eds., 2000), available at http://
environment.yale.edu/documents/downloads/0-9/104Clark.pdf.
21
Matson, supra note 19, at 109.
22
National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-57, 111
Stat. 1252 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(4)(B) (2000)).
23
16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(2), (a)(4)(N) (2000).
24
See Anders Halverson, The National Elk Refuge and the Jackson Hole Elk Herd:
Management Appraisal and Recommendations, in BULLETIN SERIES NO. 104, YALE SCHOOL
OF FORESTRY AND ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES, DEVELOPING SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT
POLICY FOR THE NATIONAL ELK REFUGE, WYOMING 23, 28 (Tim W. Clark, Denise Casey
& Anders Halverson eds., 2000), available at http://environment.yale.edu/documents/
downloads/0-9/104Halver.pdf.
25
Clark, supra note 20, at 171-72.
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Although many states have emergency protocols in place to prevent
the decimation of elk herds, no state has more than a couple of public feeding stations. In contrast, the state of Wyoming has built on the experience
of Jackson Hole to create twenty-two other public feeding stations in the
western part of the state, on Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management
(“BLM”), state, and private lands.26 Winter feeding maintains high herd
populations, compensating for the decline in natural winter feeding habitat
or providing food where little native winter range existed. Most importantly for ranchers, winter feeding reduces elk foraging of hay intended
for livestock.27
A high concentration of elk, however, creates problems of its own.
It increases the risk of major disease outbreaks. Increased populations
also cause more damage to vegetation on the feeding grounds, resulting
in a reduction of wildlife dependent on healthy stands of shrubs and trees.
Unusually low winter mortality requires hunting programs and reduces
food for predators, scavengers, and detritivores. And, most notably for federalism law and policy, high levels of brucellosis in the elk and bison herds
accompany the high density of the animals around winter feeding stations.28
Brucellosis is a disease caused by a bacterial borne pathogen,
Brucella abortus, that “infects the reproductive organs and lymphatic systems of ungulates.”29 Most commonly, the disease causes spontaneous
abortion in females during the first pregnancy following infection.
Brucellosis is usually spread by the consumption of infected tissue, or
contaminated feed or water. Thirty percent of the wild elk in western
Wyoming have brucellosis. The winter feeding grounds perpetuate the
disease because herds are in close contact during the birthing period. Elk
infect domestic cattle with brucellosis rarely under natural conditions,
but concentration of herds raises the risk.30
In 1985, the Wyoming Game and Fish Department (“WGFD”) began
vaccinating elk for brucellosis with “Strain 19.”31 Strain 19 had previously been used as a means of controlling the disease in cattle, where it
is seventy percent effective in preventing spontaneous abortions. Based on
the state’s vaccination program and test-and-removal procedures,32 the
26

Herring, supra note 15.
FEIS, supra note 3, at 6.
28
Id. at 9.
29
Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 1214, 1218-19 (10th Cir. 2002).
30
Id. at 1218-20.
31
Id. at 1220.
32
Test-and-removal involves the capture of adult female cattle for brucellosis testing. Those
27
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United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) certified Wyoming’s
cattle brucellosis-free.33
In 1997, the Governor of Wyoming, fearing the loss of Wyoming’s
brucellosis-free status for livestock—which would limit market access and
increase costs to both ranchers and the state—requested “immediate assistance and response to deal with our mutual concern with the brucellosis
issue in the State of Wyoming.”34 While the Fish and Wildlife Service
(“FWS”) promoted a multi-year efficacy study regarding Strain 19, the
Governor urged immediate action to combat the issue at hand. The FWS
responded that the state failed to demonstrate the effectiveness of Strain
19. Instead, the FWS claimed to be able to avoid the spread of the disease
through feed-line management. More specifically, the FWS began replacing
hay with alfalfa pellets and dispersed the feeding locations.35
Wyoming, however, persisted in its efforts, eventually filing a
lawsuit in 1998 challenging the FWS’s refusal to permit vaccinations.36
The district court determined that the refuge system organic act failed
to provide the state with “mutual rights to manage wildlife” on the NER.37
Although Judge Brimmer sympathized with Wyoming’s plight,38 he nonetheless found that Congress delegated to the Secretary of the Interior complete control over federal refuge lands.39 The opinion held that the statutory
savings clause40 did not alter the Secretary’s complete authority.

animals testing positive are removed and transported to a USDA-approved slaughterhouse.
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 1221.
35
Id. at 1221-22.
36
See Wyoming v. United States, 61 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (D. Wyo. 1999), rev’d, 279 F.3d 1214
(10th Cir. 2002).
37
Id. at 1223.
38
The intransigence of the Secretary trumps the well-intentioned efforts
of the State to solve the brucellosis problem in elk. Only the poor, dumb
creatures of the wild suffer as this disease spreads while the FWS dithers
over whether Wyoming’s vaccination program has imperfections. That
Wyoming’s program may not be perfect is not a sine qua non, but it at
least is moving forward to do something about a serious, spreading wildlife disease. The Court is sorry that this patchwork of federal law gives
the Secretary room to play out his stalling game while doing nothing.
Id. at 1222-23.
39
Id. at 1216, 1219, 1221.
40
See infra notes 90-104 and accompanying text. A statutory savings clause affirms the
continued existence of state power in a law granting authority to a federal agency.
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Wyoming appealed, and, in 2002, an important decision in the
litigation from the Tenth Circuit renewed interest in the legal attributes
of cooperative federalism and in a fresh approach for elk management in
Jackson Hole.41 The appeals court recognized that, under ordinary circumstances, deference to agency action is appropriate when “scientific
and technical judgment within the scope of agency expertise” is at issue.42
But, the court found the cooperative federalism concerns reason to reduce
deference. The court criticized what it perceived to be a federal indifference
to Wyoming’s legitimate interests:
The problem is that after an extended period of time, the
FWS still appears unable or unwilling to make any judgment regarding the biosafety and efficacy of Strain 19 as
applied to free-ranging elk. But the law requires answers.
For instance, the FWS has never explained why the State’s
proposal would “stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution” of federal objectives.43
The court opined that the FWS’s failure to make a judgment regarding the effectiveness of Strain 19 after more than a decade, and the
parties’ inability to reach common ground on the issue, did not satisfy the
cooperation mandate in the refuge system organic act’s savings provisions. The legislative history indicated that the savings clause preserved
the status quo, leaving difficult jurisdictional disputes for the courts to
determine on a case-by-case basis.44
The appeals court agreed with Judge Brimmer that the state’s claim
of a right to manage wildlife would be inconsistent with the mission of
the National Wildlife Refuge System (“NWRS”), which is to provide a
network of refuges managed in a consistent, national system. After
establishing that the FWS had the authority to make the decision, the
appeals court turned to the question of whether the FWS correctly made
the decision. The court interpreted the refuge organic act to suggest that
cooperative federalism limits FWS decision-making and heightens the
agency’s obligation to work with Wyoming to reach a management agreement. So, although the FWS had the authority to block state vaccination
41

See Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1240 (quoting Sierra Club-Black Hills Group v. U. S. Forest Serv., 259 F.3d
1281, 1286 (10th Cir. 2001)).
43
Id. (quoting Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883 (2000)).
44
Id. at 1233, 1238.
42
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on the NER, it may not have properly exercised this authority. The Tenth
Circuit remanded the factual determination of whether the decision was
adequately supported by the administrative record to the district court.45
Rather than continue to litigate the case, the Bush Administration
settled by agreeing to conduct an initial environmental assessment on an
interim vaccination program.46 After the federal government issued a
“finding of no significant impact,” elk vaccinations began in early 2003 and
would continue until the federal government completed a more comprehensive analysis of elk and bison management in Jackson Hole.47 Nonetheless,
for reasons not directly related to the NER program, the U.S. Department
of Agriculture revoked Wyoming’s brucellosis-free certification in 2004.48
The federal government completed the comprehensive EIS and
adopted a new elk management plan in 2007.49 The WGFD served as a
cooperating agency and partner on the EIS. The final EIS considered six
alternatives. Under Alternative One, the “no action” alternative, “[f]ew
changes would occur in managing the elk and bison herds;” therefore, the
“high prevalence of brucellosis . . . would continue.”50 Alternative Two
would greatly reduce active management of the herds on refuge lands
and phase out supplemental feeding over ten to fifteen years. Brucellosis
prevalence would be reduced over time by more natural, dispersed winter
densities. Alternative Three would actively manage the herds on refuge
lands and reduce supplemental feeding over ten years, providing it only
during the severest winters. Under this alternative, brucellosis would be
reduced as the concentrations of the herds decreased and more effective
techniques and vaccinations were developed. Alternative Four would adaptively manage both refuge and park lands, emphasizing the improvement
of winter, summer, and transitional range.51 This alternative would allow
WGFD to vaccinate the herds against brucellosis “as long as logistically
feasible.”52 Alternative Five would heavily manage the herds on refuge
45

Id. at 1234-35, 1240-41.
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United States and Wyoming Settle Suit on Elk
Vaccinations (July 31, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002/July/02_enrd
_442.htm.
47
News Release, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Finding of No Significant Impact Released
for Proposed Elk Vaccination Plan on National Elk Refuge, available at http://www.fws
.gov/mountain-prairie/pressrel/03-07.htm.
48
FEIS, supra note 3, at 185. Wyoming regained its certification in 2006. Id. at 187.
49
See id. at 8.
50
Id. at 39, 42.
51
Id. at 44, 46, 48.
52
Id. at 48.
46
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lands and permit WGFD to vaccinate elk and bison. This alternative would
provide supplemental feeding in all but the mildest winters, decreasing
disease outbreaks by spreading out feed and changing feed locations. Alternative Six would adaptively manage the herds on refuge lands to improve
winter grazing habitat and phase out supplemental feeding within five
years. Brucellosis prevalence would decrease over time as concentrations
decreased and new techniques and vaccines were developed.53
The federal government chose Alternative Four in the 2007 elk
management plan.54 The new plan emphasizes four goals: habitat conservation, sustainable populations, numbers of elk and bison, and disease
management.55 These goals are to be implemented through a “structured
framework, in collaboration with the [WGFD], of adaptive management
criteria and actions for transitioning from intensive supplemental winter
feeding.”56 The EIS, however, neither describes the “structured framework”
nor defines the criteria for winter feeding. Fundamental aspects of the plan
include population management, vegetation restoration, continuous monitoring, and public education programs.57 The state will achieve its objective
of maintaining an elk herd of approximately 11,000 through the cooperation
of the FWS, National Park Service (“NPS”), and WGFD. Although management actions will not be designed to facilitate vaccination, the WGFD is
permitted to vaccinate the herds as long as logistically feasible. The plan
does not promise to end supplemental feeding, but merely articulates a
desire to move away from supplemental feeding during good winters.58
The federal government chose the least definite alternative, which
allows for the greatest flexibility in the coming years. This kind of adaptive
management coincides with maximal discretion for the agency and is increasingly employed by federal decision makers.59 In addition to illustrating

53

Id. at 50, 52.
U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, RECORD OF DECISION:
NATIONAL ELK REFUGE, GRAND TETON NATIONAL PARK, FINAL BISON AND ELK
MANAGEMENT PLAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 4 (2007), available at
http://www.fws.gov/bisonandelkplan/ROD.pdf.
55
FEIS, supra note 3, at 41.
56
Id. at 65.
57
Id. at 48.
58
Id.
59
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., RECORD OF DECISION:
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE ATLANTIC RIM NATURAL GAS FIELD
DEVELOPMENT PROJECT 3 (2007), available at http://www.dble.us/press/2007/ROD.pdf.
The BLM’s plan for natural gas development in the Atlantic Rim of Wyoming is another
illustration of a federal agency choosing a highly discretionary “adaptive management”
54
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the federalism dynamics of wildlife management in public land administration, the recent National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) exercise
also illustrates the difficulty of applying adaptive management to United
States administrative procedures. With fewer subsequent opportunities
to shape the large-scale strategy for elk, stakeholders understandably
would like greater certainty at the time the Interior Department establishes a record of decision. However, adaptive management counsels continual reopening of tools and timetables. It also, though, offers a cloak of
legitimacy for an agency seeking to dodge commitment to an objective.
Many federal wildlife biologists and environmental groups, led by
the Greater Yellowstone Coalition, oppose any elk management plan that
fails to set strict timetables for phasing out vaccination and clear criteria
for the circumstances justifying supplemental winter feeding.60 Without
firm commitments to end winter feeding, they fear that the inertia of the
current feeding practices will perpetuate the unhealthy, high concentrations of winter elk populations.61 They favored Alternative Six because it established a definite deadline of five years for terminating winter feeding.62
All stakeholders in the elk management process claim healthy elk
populations as their prime objective. The disagreement focuses on whether
continued winter feeding with vaccination is the best way to achieve that
end.63 In his review of the brucellosis controversy fifteen years ago,
alternative. Id. The Interior Board of Land Appeals recently refused to stay the BLM
decision against a challenge based, in part, on the “amorphous” content of the adaptive
management alternative chosen. PUBLIC LAND NEWS BULLETIN #9 (2007) (reporting on
Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partnership, et al., IBLA 2007-2008 (2007)).
60
GREATER YELLOWSTONE COALITION, RE: FINAL BISON AND ELK MANAGEMENT PLAN AND
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (FEIS) 4-5 (2007) (on file with author).
61
Cory Hatch, Refuge Plan Slashes Herd, JACKSON HOLE NEWS & GUIDE, Feb. 7, 2007,
available at http://www.greateryellowstone.org/press/article.php?article_id=1600 (quoting
a spokesman for the Greater Yellowstone Coalition as stating “[y]ou have to wonder if the
agencies intend to go forward with business as usual or if they intend to carefully phase
out artificial feeding”).
62
Id.
63
The decision agencies, however, failed to choose Alternative 6, which they rated as the
best option for overall wildlife and plant protection on the NER. See FEIS, supra note 3,
at 83. The Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service commented that Alternative 6 would provide for healthier elk. It found that the higher population levels of Alternative 4’s “unnatural concentration of animals” raises the risk of
“disease persistence and spread.” Letter from John R. Clifford, Deputy Administrator,
Veterinary Services, APHIS, to Ralph Morganweck, Regional Director, Mountain Prairie
Region Fish & Wildlife Services (May 20, 2005), reprinted in FEIS, supra note 3, at 3-4,
available at http://www.fws.gov/bisonandelkplan/Final%20EIS/Volume2/1_Intro_Cmt-15.pdf.
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Professor Robert Keiter observed a divide in professional culture between
range scientists and wildlife biologists.64 While range scientists are comfortable with intensive management that includes vaccination and slaughter,
wildlife biologists tend to favor populations that fluctuate wildly in response to natural conditions.65 Keiter attributed the division to divergent
professional views on the relationship between people and nature. Range
scientists emphasize that science can and should be able to improve nature.
Wildlife biologists, however, focus on park and wilderness settings as excellent opportunities to observe nature’s ways, which provides valuable
baseline scientific data.66 The WGFD’s position belies this simple dichotomy. Instead of backing the natural regulation policy usually favored by
wildlife biologists, the WGFD has aligned with the livestock ranchers
(and hunters/outfitters) to support intensive management of brucellosis
through vaccination. This is partly a reflection of the political power the
livestock and hunting sectors wield across Wyoming state government.67
It is also related to the fiscal realities faced by WGFD, which derives much
of its budget from hunting licenses: elk are prime, big-game in Wyoming.
High elk populations translate into more revenue for WGFD. And, easily
watchable or huntable elk sustain an important component of the Jackson
Hole tourism economy.68
While philosophically disposed to prefer natural variations in elk
populations, the environmental groups also rely on scientists and the
Animal Plant Health Inspection Service’s findings that infectious diseases
will be more likely to sweep through elk maintained by winter feeding.69
The vaccinations do not eliminate brucellosis, and sometimes fail to contain
64

Robert B. Keiter & Peter H. Froelicher, Bison, Brucellosis, and Law in the Greater
Yellowstone Ecosystem, 28 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 64-66 (1993).
65
Id. at 65. This is also consistent with former NER Manager Barry Reiswig’s observation
that “[t]he wildlife professionals all felt that it was time to bite the bullet and phase out the
feed grounds.” Herring, supra note 15.
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Keiter & Froelicher, supra note 64, at 65.
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Todd Wilkinson, Mismanagement, Ineptitude, and Ignorance? In Wyoming, Charges and
Countercharges Fly over Elk, NEW WEST NETWORK (May 24, 2006), available at http:/
/www.newwest.net/index.php/main/article/in_wyoming_charges_and_countercharges_
fly_over_elk/.
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WYO. GAME & FISH DEP’T, SHERIDAN REGION, A ROCKY MOUNTAIN ELK HABITAT
CONSERVATION PLAN FOR THE WGFD SHERIDAN REGION (AND PORTIONS OF THE CODY
REGION) 3 (2004), available at http://gf.state.wy.us/downloads/pdf/Elk_Conservation
_Plan-V2.pdf.
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Whitney Royster, USDA Wants Faster Elk-Feeding Phase Out, STAR TRIBUNE (Aug. 9,
2005), available at http://www.casperstartribune.net/articles/2005/08/09/news/wyoming/
1de5bcf05e4d2648872570580004e4bf.txt.
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it.70 Looming on the horizon is the spread of a devastating chronic wasting
disease that may sweep through concentrated elk populations and decimate herds.71 For supporters of Alternative Six, Wyoming created the brucellosis problem through its aggressive winter feeding programs and should
address the problem by removing the underlying cause rather than rely
on a risky strategy of vaccination that neither eliminates elk brucellosis
nor protects against other infectious risks and habitat degradation caused
by crowding.
Many hunters remain concerned by the winter program’s increased
risk of chronic wasting disease. But, some hunting groups support winter
feeding to maintain greater opportunities for bagging elk: Sportsmen for
Fish and Wildlife (“SFW”) staged a “Hay Day” in December 2006 to draw
attention to its claim that the NER was underfeeding the wintering elk.
SFW attracted publicity when it delivered sixty tons of unsolicited hay to
the NER in a convoy with a police escort.72 The longtime NER Manager,
Barry Reiswig, who thinks that protecting more acres of natural winter
habitat is the lynchpin of elk conservation, candidly commented that:
Right now, we have millions of acres of public land with
mule deer and antelope on it, but elk are barred from ever
going there. Instead, they are kept on these postage stamps
(the feed grounds), time bombs for disease. The stock
growers are not economically powerful, but they have political power, and they have kept the fish and game from
buying any more winter range.73
II.

THE DISTINCTIVE TYPES OF NATURAL RESOURCES FEDERALISM

How does the NER elk dispute map onto the legal structure of
federalism? Although politics and policy drive elk management more than
statutes and courts, the legal foundation of the state-federal relationship
does shape the range of options. This and the following parts explore
those legal underpinnings of federalism in action. Federalism in environmental law is most often associated with the model pervasive in pollution
70

Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 1214, 1220 (10th Cir. 2002).
See Wyo. Game & Fish Dep’t, Wyoming: CWD Found in New Hunt Area Near Ucross,
CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE ALLIANCE, Oct. 12, 2007, http://www.cwd-info.org/index.php/
fuseaction/news.detail/ID/5f4e8c5976693ee88d52a0c9451ed2ea.
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See Herring, supra note 15.
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control: state permitting and standard-setting overseen by the federal
government to assure compliance with national minimum criteria. The
programs under the Clean Air Act (“CAA”)74 and the Clean Water Act
(“CWA”)75 illustrate this narrow model of cooperative federalism. Both
programs involve state implementation of federal standards. Natural
resources law, in contrast, employs a wider array of cooperative tools,
including place-based collaboration, state favoritism in federal process,
and federal deference to state process.
A.

Place-Based Collaboration

Place-based collaboration tailors decision-making about the environment to a specific region. Rather than impose a uniform model for interaction, place-based collaborations grow from the particular circumstances
of the locus and nature of a dispute. The chief strength of this approach
is that it brings a wide range of stakeholders and regulatory jurisdictions
together to engage in holistic management. Place-based collaborations
are one of the most popular current approaches to cooperative federalism
in natural resources law. Place-based collaboration softens the commandand-control requirements that typically bind parties in environmental law;
instead, it employs more flexibility to create a watershed-, jurisdiction-,
or habitat-specific approach. It also helps satisfy many of the criteria for
ecosystem management. The clearest, and longest-term, recent trend in
natural resources law has been reliance on more place-based collaborations.
This is a bipartisan enthusiasm.
Place-based collaborations, however, risk local capture and may
frustrate coordinated management of public lands systems. Widely debated examples include the CALFED Bay-Delta program to manage fish
and other resources in the Sacramento River Delta,76 the board Congress
created to operate the Valles Caldera National Preserve as a national forest
unit,77 and the cooperative agreement outsourcing much of the management of the National Bison Range to the Confederated Salish and Kootenai
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42 U.S.C. § 7402 (2000).
33 U.S.C. § 1252 (2000).
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See Matt Jenkins, Trouble in the Delta, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Feb. 6, 2006, available at
http://www.hcn.org/servlets/hcn.Article?article_id=16082.
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See 16 U.S.C. § 698v-5(a) (2000). For further information regarding the Valles Caldera
Trust and its progress, see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-98, VALLES
CALDERA: TRUST HAS MADE SOME PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS TO DO MORE TO MEET STATUTORY
GOALS (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0698.pdf.
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tribal governments.78 The Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) habitat conservation planning program has spurred many controversial place-based
management initiatives. For instance, the FWS issued an incidental take
permit in 2005 endorsing a tri-state effort to manage the lower Colorado
River’s aquatic habitat.79 The NEPA EIS process may provide a vehicle for
place-based collaboration, especially when the lead federal agency invites
states to participate as cooperating agencies.80 The Jackson Hole elk management case study, which embraced a multi-jurisdictional region, displays
elements of place-based collaboration. But, even though the EIS covered
a broad area and the WGFD worked closely with the Interior Department
as a cooperating agency, the EIS foreswore evaluation of private land management, which has an important role to play in determining whether elk
can migrate to natural winter habitat.81
B.

State Favoritism in Federal Process

State favoritism in federal process is a coordinating tool that
reserves an enhanced role for states in federal environmental decisionmaking. Although it does not guarantee that the state view will prevail,82
federal agency decision makers have a responsibility to at least document
their consideration of the state’s view and to explain why it did not prevail. The state’s direct avenue to assert its interests is often not open to
other stakeholders in the federal decision. The organic acts for the national
forest, national wildlife refuge, and BLM land systems all employ this tool
in their comprehensive planning mandates.83 Moreover, as the Wyoming
decision reflects, organic acts may even assure states special consideration

78

See FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, FISCAL YEARS 2005-2006
ANNUAL FUNDING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE
AND THE CONFEDERATED SALISH AND KOOTENAI TRIBES OF THE FLATHEAD RESERVATION
§§ 5-7 (2004), available at http://www.fws.gov/mountain-prairie/cskt-fws-negotiation/
nbrc_afa _12104final.pdf. The National Bison Range was designated as part of the National
Wildlife Refuge System in 1908. See 16 U.S.C. § 671 (2000).
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U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 2 LOWER COLORADO RIVER MULTI-SPECIES CONSERVATION
PROGRAM, FINAL HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN (2004), available at http://www.lcrmscp
.gov/publications/VolumeII.pdf.
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See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.6 (2006).
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FEIS, supra note 3, at iii, 4, 8, 23.
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See, e.g., Fischman, supra note 2, at 200 n.83.
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See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (2000); 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(e)(1)(A)(iii) (2000); 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)
(2000).
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in specific agency decisions that fall short of comprehensive planning, such
as whether to vaccinate elk.84
The Bush II Administration has been particularly enamored of state
favoritism, as exemplified by the now-suspended roadless rule. The 2005
rule invited state governors to petition the Forest Service to promulgate
special rules establishing management requirements for roadless areas
within the state.85 The rule bound the Forest Service to act on the state
petition within a definite time frame, but reserved federal national forest
management authority. The roadless rule’s version of procedural favoritism was inspired by the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act,86 which provides an
alternative to congressional river designation where a governor applies
to the Interior Secretary for administrative designation of rivers protected
under state law.87 Like the adaptive alternative selected by the Interior
Department for elk management in 2007, the roadless rule failed to contain criteria indicating precisely how the federal agency would exercise
its discretion in making substantive decisions. Without standards by
which to review agency action, state favoritism may promote a version of
cooperative federalism tantamount to political favoritism.
C.

Federal Deference to State Process

Federal deference to state process is created when legislation
specifies that, if adopted in accordance with certain procedures, a state
policy, standard, or plan will be employed by the federal government in
its own national decisions. Although procedural favoritism gives states a
comparative advantage over other stakeholders in asserting interests in
federal decision-making, this third category—federal deference—provides
greater assurance that the federal government will actually comply with
the state position. The best statutory example of this approach to cooperative federalism is the Coastal Zone Management Act’s (“CZMA”)

84

See Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2002).
See Special Areas; State Petitions for Inventoried Roadless Area Management, 70 Fed.
Reg. 25,654 (May 13, 2005) (codified at 36 C.F.R. §§ 294.10-294.13) [hereinafter Roadless
Rule].
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16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (2000).
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Id. § 1273(a)(ii). The Interior Secretary must find that the state-nominated river meets
federal criteria established by law and regulation. Id. For a case study of this avenue for
state favoritism, see Sally K. Fairfax et al., Federalism and the Wild and Scenic Rivers
Act: Now You See it, Now You Don’t, 59 WASH. L. REV. 417 (1984).
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consistency criterion.88 But, this approach also pops up in public land management. For example, federal public lands routinely embrace state hunting regulations as a default rule; even the FWS regards state-permitted
takes as per se appropriate for national wildlife refuges.89
Because federal deference to state process is the strongest restraint
on federal activities, it has not been a particularly attractive tool for any
administration recently. Even the outcome of the NER dispute, which
largely extends the invitation for Wyoming to continue its program of elk
management on federal lands, still reserves federal authority (and announces at least the intention) to modify and phase out the state approach.
III.

STATUTORY SAVINGS CLAUSES

Describing the large-scale structure of natural resources federalism
or summarizing recent trends in its implementation falls short of providing
a fine-tuned understanding of the relationship between law and federalism
policy. This Part introduces statutory savings clauses, which have long set
the tone for integrating state concerns and procedures into federal
programs. Such clauses provide key links for connecting federal law with
state policies.
A statutory savings clause seeks to delimit the degree to which a
federal agency should pursue national objectives at the expense of a state’s
different view. It provides a statement, and sometimes a mechanism, for
incorporating state interests notwithstanding a statute that seeks to implement a uniform federal program. For instance, the Wyoming appeals court
used the savings provision in the national wildlife refuge system organic act
to set the stage for greater state involvement in NER elk management.90
Savings clauses approach the protection of state (or tribal) prerogatives in a variety of ways. Some statutes have a single section that bundles
together all of the savings promises while others have separate sections for
each savings program. In general, however, it is useful to divide savings
clauses (which may be sections or parts of sections) into two types: jurisdictional and cooperative. Savings clauses may lack a definite expression
of their intended impact on the federalism issue or they may combine both
jurisdictional and cooperative components.
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16 U.S.C. § 1456(c) (2000).
U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE MANUAL [hereinafter
U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE MANUAL], pt. 603 § 1.3(B) (2006), available at http://
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Jurisdictional savings clauses focus on the line separating federal
from state power. All savings clauses implicitly address this separation,
but the true jurisdictional clauses carve out distinct areas for either federal
action or state authority. The jurisdictional savings clauses are particularly important in regulatory statutes and less prominent in public land
management legislation.
The most famous example of a jurisdictional savings clause establishing the reach of a national regulatory program is the Federal Power
Act’s provision giving the Federal Power Commission (now the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission) a mandate to regulate interstate sale and
transmission of electricity.91 The seminal 1945 Supreme Court decision in
Connecticut Light & Power Co. limited the Commission’s jurisdiction more
narrowly than Congress’s possible range of delegated Commerce Clause
authority because of the savings clause’s description of those aspects of
the electric market for which federal regulation is “necessary in the public
interest.”92 This principal jurisdictional clause of the Act circumscribes
the outer bounds of federal agency authority. Almost forty years later, the
Supreme Court employed a similar approach in Pacific Gas & Electric
Co., reading the savings clauses of the organic authority for the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission to allow state rules which limited the development of nuclear power in California.93
An important subset of jurisdictional savings clauses carve out a
specific area of state law that Congress preserves despite a preemptive
statutory program. The most common type of state law savings clause
affirms the continued availability of state common law causes of action
notwithstanding federal regulation. For instance, the Federal Boat Safety
Act preempts state “law or regulation” but the savings clause “does not relieve a person from liability at common law or under State law.”94 Although
it is less common, some federal statutes save aspects of state regulation.95
The Clean Water Act saves both statutory and common law rights under
state law to seek enforcement of standards or other relief.96
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16 U.S.C. § 792 (2000).
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Cooperative savings clauses are particularly important in public
resource management. They go beyond the sorting and separating of
powers to describe how the two levels of government should work together.
For instance, the Federal Land Policy Management Act (“FLPMA”) requires
federal resource management plans to be “consistent with State and local
plans to the maximum extent [the Interior Secretary] . . . finds consistent
with Federal law and the purposes of this Act.”97 Consistency review under
FLPMA has a regulation of its own that describes a substantive test and
procedure for determining when the BLM will accept the recommendations
of a Governor on a plan.98 This state favoritism finds expression in national
forest and national wildlife refuge planning as well.99
Unfortunately, many savings clauses appear agnostic when faced
with real federalism disputes. The best example is the Wilderness Act’s
provision on state water law: “Nothing in this chapter shall constitute an
express or implied claim or denial on the part of the Federal Government
as to exemption from State water laws.”100 Such a clause can cause more litigation and controversy than it resolves, but it may be an essential element
in the legislative compromise allowing passage of the law. Congress may
use a savings clause as a means to preserve the status quo, leaving complex
federalism disputes open for courts to sort out when the issues arise.101
Hybrid savings clauses combining features of jurisdiction and
cooperation are common. For instance, the CWA’s “Wallop Amendment”
states that:
It is the policy of Congress that the authority of each State
to allocate quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall
not be superseded, abrogated or otherwise impaired by this
chapter. It is the further policy of Congress that nothing
in this chapter shall be construed to supersede or abrogate
rights to quantities of water which have been established
by any State. Federal agencies shall co-operate with State
and local agencies to develop comprehensive solutions to
prevent, reduce and eliminate pollution in concert with
programs for managing water resources.102
97
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The Wallop Amendment was a product of compromise meant to resolve
the jurisdictional reach of the CWA. Disputes over the extent of
jurisdiction exercised under the dredge or fill permitting program, and
the resulting effect such jurisdiction would have on water development
and agricultural uses, stalled reauthorization of the CWA from 1975 to
1977. To break the legislative log jam, Congress adopted the Wallop
Amendment to alleviate concerns about infringements on state water
rights.103 Although the Amendment concludes with a cooperative savings
clause, the jurisdictional issue has played the more important role in
shaping the interpretation of the CWA and other regulatory statutes.
In contrast, public land legislation—because it focuses on particular
federal tracts—tends to generate fewer jurisdictional disputes. For example, although the organic act for the refuge system contains a hybrid
savings provision, the cooperative clause has played the more important
role in interpretation. The refuge savings provision states:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting the
authority, jurisdiction, or responsibility of the several States
to manage, control, or regulate fish and resident wildlife
under State law or regulations in any area within the
System. Regulations permitting hunting or fishing of fish
and resident wildlife within the System shall be, to the
extent practicable, consistent with State fish and wildlife
laws, regulations, and management plans.104
The refuge system savings provision illustrates the schizophrenic tone
of many of these perplexing formulations. Although eschewing the split
personality of some other clauses that neither affirm nor deny key propositions about the division of power, the second sentence of the provision
does seem to contradict the facial meaning of the first sentence. If nothing
in the organic act for national wildlife refuges truly affects state authority
to regulate wildlife (first sentence), then why would the federal government
be regulating hunting in ways that may be inconsistent with state law
(second sentence)? Partly for this reason, the refuge savings provision can
only be useful for its cooperative component. The Wyoming litigation bears
this out.

103
Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr. & Bennett W. Raley, Water Rights Protection in Water Quality
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The general, self-abnegating, contradictory, and puzzling savings
clauses cry out for interpretation. State-federal conflicts have fueled judicial
efforts to determine the meaning of these statutory provisions. The next
Part describes the ways in which courts analyze the savings clauses.
IV.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SAVINGS CLAUSES

What should we make of these instructions to cooperate with states
while fulfilling legislative missions circumscribed by “saved” state authorities affecting water, wildlife, fish, intra-state interests, or common law
causes of action? Courts have been answering versions of this question
since the New Deal.105 Each decade, however, reaps a fresh harvest of
slightly different savings clauses. Recent conflicts, including the NER elk
dispute, have revived interest in the meaning of the congressional commands. The judicial interpretation of savings clauses shapes the future
of federalism in natural resources law.
There is a continuum of interpretive approaches from almost
vanishingly weak to relatively strong drivers of agency structure and
procedure. To date, the vast majority of decisions fall on the weak side,
creating a consensus in the judiciary that Congress does not mean to command or limit very much with savings clauses. Hints of change, however—
particularly from the 2002 Wyoming decision—may indicate possible
movement toward a stronger version of savings clauses. In order to see how
courts understand savings clauses, it is useful to divide interpretations
into two categories—weak and strong—each of which has three variations.
A caveat is in order, however. Many court decisions, especially Wyoming,
mix together several of the approaches. Parts of Wyoming, for instance,
support at least three of the options described below.
This Part begins with the weakest interpretive option and moves
toward the strongest extreme.
A.

Weak Interpretations

The weak interpretations all share the characteristic of contributing
nothing to the actual disposition of a case. General principles of statutory
interpretation, preemption analysis, and administrative law subsume weak
interpretation under the more broadly applied judicial rules of decision.
Most opinions that have considered savings clauses fall into this category.
105
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Hortatory

One can hardly read a savings clause without detecting a whiff of
apple pie. A common, honest interpretation of the savings clause is that
it is a mere exhortation of good politics: pay attention to local attitudes,
particularly as reflected in state policy. In the natural resources context
this translates roughly into an interpretation that Congress intended to
instruct agencies to be good neighbors when they can. Because this weakest of interpretations does not force an agency to do or show anything, it
provides almost no traction for judicial relief. A hortatory interpretation
is most likely for a savings clause in an introductory section of a statute,
laying out broad, ambitious, and conflicting goals.
An example of this approach can be found in Riverside Irrigation
District v. Andrews.106 In that case, various water districts challenged the
decision of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) to require an individual permit application for the construction of a dam.107 Because building
the dam would require deposition of fill material into a navigable waterway, Section 404 of the CWA required a permit from the Corps.108 The
irrigation districts argued that the dam construction fell within one of the
categories of nationwide permits that the Corps created in CWA regulations. The regulations included certain conditions that, if met, allow the
nationwide permit to apply automatically. The Corps determined that the
water districts did not satisfy the conditions and, therefore, were required
to obtain an individual permit through a public hearing and notice process.
Specifically, the Corps found that the discharge would “destroy” a species
protected under the Endangered Species Act—the whooping crane. The
Corps did not conclude that the fill activity itself would adversely affect
the whooping crane’s habitat. Instead, the Corps determined that the
reservoir created by the dam would result in the depletion of stream flow
because of increased consumptive use, indirectly harming the whooping
crane’s habitat downstream.109
The water districts claimed that the Corps exceeded its authority
in considering water quantity and indirect effects. The court, however,
found that specific provisions of the CWA statute and regulations required
consideration of all effects on the “aquatic environment” resulting from
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See Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 510.
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the fill, not just factors related to water quality. The water districts claimed
that the Corps denial violated the CWA’s Wallop Amendment by impairing the state’s ability to allocate water within its jurisdiction. The court,
citing Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission,110 held
the Wallop Amendment to be “only a general policy statement” unable to
invalidate the clear and specific grant of jurisdiction given to the Corps.
In the absence of a jurisdictional limitation within the specific provisions
authorizing the fill permit program, the court ruled for the Corps, despite
the rhetoric of the savings clause.111 The Supreme Court unequivocally endorsed this interpretation in PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington
Department of Ecology.112
2.

Confirmatory

The next step for a court looking for somewhat more content in a
savings statement is to interpret it to mean that the ordinary principles
of conflict preemption apply. In other words, Congress did not attempt
to preempt the entire field. This interpretation is a bit stronger than a
mere policy suggestion, but generally adds nothing to an understanding
of the statute. In environmental law, there is scarcely any legislation that
preempts an entire field, and the rare exceptions are clear about their
scope. Hence, an interpretation where ordinary principles apply merely
confirms what a court would do in the absence of a savings clause. Generally, Congress need not specify that any ordinary principles of statutory
analysis apply; by definition, the ordinary ordinarily applies. The most
fundamental canon of statutory interpretation on preemption assumes
that the historic police powers of the states were not to be superseded
by the federal act “unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.”113 The confirmatory approach to savings clauses simply reads
the statute to acquiesce to this ordinary assumption favoring state prerogatives. Still, there may be some justification for the belt-and-suspenders
approach of making absolutely sure that courts and agencies understand
the scope of delegated authority.
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A good example of this approach is National Audubon Society v.
Davis, which held that the national wildlife refuge system’s organic act preempts state regulation of trapping on federal lands within the system.114
The National Audubon Society, in an effort to protect birds from predation, challenged the application of “Proposition 4”—a popularly adopted
California law which sought to protect the welfare of animals by banning
the use of certain types of traps. The court characterized the dispute as one
between “bird-lovers” and “fox-lovers,” but more fundamentally the litigation amounted to a determination of the relative scope of state wildlife
management on federal lands. The state prohibition on certain types of
traps conflicted with federal refuge administration, which employed some
of the state-banned, leg-hold traps. The court found this to be a situation
of direct conflict and therefore preempted the state law.115
The court reasoned that the United States Constitution’s Property
Clause authorized Congress to delegate refuge management authority to
the FWS. That delegated power did not contain any limitations with respect to traps. Therefore, supremacy trumped the state law. The court
reached this result notwithstanding the Refuge Improvement Act’s savings
provision.116 National Audubon Society v. Davis read the provision to
endorse the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of the statute “as reflecting
Congress’s intent for ‘ordinary principles of conflict preemption to apply
in cases such as this.’ ”117
3.

Documentary

Beyond mere advice and ordinary principles of preemption, the next
option for a court is to interpret a savings clause to require the agency to
put something in the record showing consideration of state views. Like the
confirmatory approach, this does not add much substance to the scope of
review ordinarily applicable under the Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”). Given the importance of state favoritism as a widely used tool of
natural resources federalism, this option attractively matches the literal
terms of many savings clauses.
For example, in Richardson v. Bureau of Land Management, the
governor of New Mexico challenged the adoption of a BLM Resource
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Management Plan Amendment (“RMPA”) dealing with oil and gas leasing on federal lands in southern New Mexico, including Otero Mesa.118
Although the litigation involved many statutory challenges, the important
one for our purposes is the allegation that the BLM violated the FLPMA
cooperative savings clause, because the RMPA conflicted with a State
Water Plan, two state wildlife management plans relating to species recovery, the New Mexico Noxious Weed Management Act, and State Water
Quality Control regulations.119 The court held that although FLPMA encouraged cooperation and commanded BLM to consider state plans, BLM
retained deference to determine whether the state plans were consistent
with federal goals. The court held that the judiciary should overturn a
BLM decision only where there is a “clear, specific conflict between a
federal land use plan and a specific state plan.”120 In this case, the court
held that the alleged conflicts were based on mere general statements,
“likely” effects, and unspecified interference. Thus, all that FLPMA
required of the BLM was to take the state plans into account and address
differences of opinion in the administrative record. In other words, the
savings clause “requires that BLM pay attention to the suggestions,
concerns, and land use plans of a state,” but “BLM was entitled to decide
that as a policy matter it preferred its own proposal, and the Court is not
in a position to question that policy decision.”121 This interpretation of the
savings clause restates the basic principles of administrative law under
the APA.
B.

Strong Interpretations

Strong interpretations add something to the judicial analysis that
might influence the outcome of a dispute. A strong interpretation means
that a savings clause adds a factor into litigation that would otherwise be
absent or less important. Strong interpretations are scarce in the reported
decisions, and all but one of the versions described below remain hypothetical options for a court seeking to promote state deference to greater effect.
The three approaches described below, however, map out the territory for
courts seeking greater traction from savings provisions.
118
Richardson v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 459 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1107 (D.N.M. 2006). The
controversy over oil and gas development on the Otero Mesa is discussed at length in
Part V.A.
119
Id. at 1119; see 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c) (2000).
120
Richardson, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 1120.
121
Id. at 1119-22.
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Interpretive

Savings clauses can be read to resolve ambiguities in a statute in
favor of state interests. Where Congress did not precisely address the issue,
the interpretive rule would put a finger on the scale in favor of deference
to the state. Of course, there are almost always other factors—such as legislative history and textual analysis—to consider in understanding the
meaning of a statute. Therefore, this principle of interpretation may not
be dispositive, but it would be in play.
Although there do not appear to be any judicial opinions employing
the interpretive approach in resolving disputes over savings clauses, the
approach is analogous to the Chevron principle of administrative law. In
Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, the Court decided
that where a statute does not precisely address a question at issue, the
judiciary should interpret the legislation in a way that defers to the consistent judgment of the implementing agency.122 The Court considered some
of the most complicated and stringent sections of the 1977 amendments
to the Clean Air Act, specifically the non-attainment zone provisions requiring permits for any new or modified major stationary source. The controversy centered on whether EPA could enable states to characterize a “major
stationary source” using a plant-wide definition. The agency interpreted
the statute to embrace the “bubble” approach to regulation, which allows
polluters to trade off among the various individual vents and stacks within
a facility. Environmentalists criticized the bubble approach for undermining the statute’s effort to single out non-attainment areas for stricter
regulation. The Court unanimously held that the judiciary should give
deference to the consistent judgment of the implementing agency when
Congress did not clearly convey their intent in the legislation.123
As applied in the federalism context, the interpretive approach
would fill lacunae and imprecisely anticipated circumstances by deferring
to state decisions. Just as the Chevron rule is justified by the preeminent
role that agencies play in making policy, the interpretive approach to
finding meaning in savings clauses would be justified by the default and
traditional dominance of state interests in controlling land, water, and
wildlife.
122

Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Counsel, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
Id. at 840, 843, 864; see Jody Freeman, The Story of Chevron: Environmental Law and
Administrative Discretion, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 171-99 (Richard J. Lazarus &
Oliver A. Houck eds., 2005). Only six justices participated in the decision. Justice Marshall
did not participate at all due to illness; Justice Rehnquist was not present at Conference
because he did not attend argument; and Justice O’Connor recused herself due to a conflict
of interest. Freeman, supra, at 196.
123
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The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the McCarran Amendment’s
federalism-minded authorization for the United States to be “joined as a
defendant” in state general stream adjudications is an example that approaches the strong interpretive approach. In both Colorado River Water
Conservation District v. United States and Arizona v. San Carlos Apache
Tribe, the Court resolved issues not precisely addressed by the Amendment
in a manner that fulfills the “underlying policy,” which required constructions favoring states over the United States (as trustee for tribes).124
Professor Benson has accurately characterized these holdings as elevating
policy above text.125
Another example involving federal administration of water law
comes from an interpretation of the savings clause in the 1902 Reclamation
Act, which presents an easy case for strong construction because it is less
discretionary than most of the more recent savings clauses discussed in
this chapter. Section 8 of the Reclamation Act states that:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect or to in any way interfere with [state water
laws.] . . . [T]he Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out
the provisions of this Act, shall proceed in conformity with
such laws.126
In California v. United States, the Court interpreted this savings clause
as an example of “cooperative federalism” even though that term was not
in the legal argot of 1902.127 In a ringing endorsement of deference to states
Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the majority, derived the principles of federalism not solely from the Constitution and relevant statutes, but also
from the lived experience of national development through manifest destiny. As part of the Central Valley Project, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
applied to California for water appropriation permits in order to impound
a reservoir behind the New Melones Dam. The state agency in charge of
water permits granted the Bureau’s application but subject to twenty-five
conditions. The most contentious condition prohibited full impoundment

124
Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 810 (1976);
Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Ariz., 463 U.S. 545, 570 (1983).
125
Reed D. Benson, Deflating the Deference Myth: National Interests vs. State Authority
under Federal Laws Affecting Water Use, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 241, 272 (2006).
126
43 U.S.C. § 383 (2000).
127
California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 650 (1978).
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until the United States could show firm commitments (e.g. through a specific plan) for the use of the water. The federal government challenged
the state’s power to impose the conditions and the Court ruled for
California. Limiting the dicta of earlier cases interpreting the Reclamation
Act, the Court held that the United States must follow state conditions
unless an explicit statutory provision conflicts with them. Absent an expressly inconsistent provision in the statute, the savings clause compels
the federal government to accept the judgment of states in implementing
reclamation policy.128
2.

Scrutinizing

The most intriguing kind of strong interpretation triggers a
heightened scope of review where federalism disputes lead to challenges
of agency action. Like the interpretive approach, the scrutinizing approach
understands a savings clause as bending ordinary principles of administrative and procedural law. This category raises the bar considerably for
an agency to justify its actions in light of a disagreement about resource
management with a state. The scrutinizing approach may be thought of
as a kind of State Farm analysis requiring better reasoning than courts
normally demand from an agency because of a special circumstance.129 In
State Farm, the Court remanded a Department of Transportation revocation of a rule requiring passive restraints in automobiles. The Court
rejected the Reagan Administration’s argument that the Court should
review deregulation under the same permissive standard used when reviewing a decision not to regulate in the first place. Indeed, a majority held
that the agency faced greater scrutiny for reversal of a prior position than
it would in promulgation of an original rule.130 While in State Farm the
special circumstance justifying more judicial scrutiny of a record was the
reversal of a regulation, in the federalism context the special circumstance would be a savings clause with a bite.
Although the Tenth Circuit’s decision in the NER elk management
dispute contains statements that employ the hortatory and confirmatory
128

Id. at 647-52, 676-78.
See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29 (1983).
130
Id. at 41-42 (stating “[r]evocation constitutes a reversal of the agency’s former views as
to the proper course. . . . [A]n agency changing its course by rescinding a rule is obligated
to supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may be required when an
agency does not act in the first instance.”).
129
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approaches to interpreting savings clauses, they do not explain the outcome of the case as well as the scrutinizing approach.131 As discussed in
Part II, Wyoming applied the refuge organic act’s savings provision in
deciding that the United States has the authority to block state vaccination
of elk on the NER but must use the authority consistent with the cooperation clause.132 In Wyoming, the court used the scrutinizing approach to
place an unusually heavy burden of proof on the FWS to show the inefficacy of the vaccination program advocated by the state. In sending the case
back to the district court to make a finding of whether the administrative
record sufficiently justified the FWS refusal of Wyoming’s request, the
Tenth Circuit strongly hinted that the record would fail the application
of the scrutinizing test it established.133
Judge Baldock, writing for the Wyoming court, viewed the legal
claims of both the federal and state governments as overreaching. The
state made sovereignty claims and asserted concurrent, if not exclusive,
authority over wildlife management on the NER. The FWS asserted unlimited discretion under refuge organic act to manage wildlife on the NER.
According to the court, the state claimed that the FWS acted outside its
statutory authority in refusing to permit the state to vaccinate because of
Tenth Amendment constraints. The court, however, held that the Constitution, not a federal statute, determines whether the Tenth Amendment
reserved a power to the states.134 Although the court recognized that states
historically had the power to manage wildlife on federal lands within the
state, this resulted from congressional acquiescence, not from the Constitution. The Property Clause empowered Congress to exercise jurisdiction
over federal lands within a state, and the National Wildlife Refuge System
Improvement Act (“NWRSIA”) did just that for refuges. Whether the state
was able to manage wildlife on federal lands within the state depended upon
the extent to which Congress exercised its Property Clause power in enacting NWRSIA. Although the court agreed that the first sentence of the
savings provision135 seemed to give the state sweeping authority in the
management of wildlife, the act taken as a whole did not support the state’s
assertion of power. The court cited the second sentence of the savings

131

See Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2002).
See id. at 1234-35.
133
See id. at 1241.
134
Id. at 1226.
135
“Nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting the authority, jurisdiction, or responsibility of the several States to manage, control, or regulate fish and resident wildlife under
State law or regulations in any area within the System.” 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(m) (2000).
132
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provision,136 the savings clause’s legislative history, and the overall mission
of the NWRS to deny the state’s sovereign claim. The second sentence of the
savings clause directs the FWS to act consistent with state laws, regulations, and management plans only “to the extent practicable.”137
The court held that the FWS did have the authority to block state
vaccination on the NER but that the FWS may not have properly exercised
that authority. The statutory savings clause and other statements in the
legislation calling for cooperation demand a clearly justified explanation
for the federal government’s denial of Wyoming’s request.138 The court recognized that, under ordinary circumstances, deference to agency action is
appropriate when “scientific and technical judgments within the scope of
agency expertise” is at issue.139 But, the court found the cooperative federalism concerns reason to reduce deference. This approach reverses the
general rule that the burden is placed on the party proposing to conduct
an action on federal land to show that the action will be consistent with
relevant standards.
While affirming that the FWS had the authority to block state
vaccination on the refuge, the court insisted that the decision must be
reached through real cooperation:
The FWS’s apparent indifference to the State of Wyoming’s
problem and the State’s insistence of a “sovereign right” to
manage wildlife on the NER do little to promote “cooperative
federalism.” Given the [refuge organic act]’s repeated calls
for a “cooperative federalism,” we find inexcusable the parties’ unwillingness in this case to even attempt to amicably resolve the brucellosis controversy or find any common
ground on which to commence fruitful negotiations.140
A related, but not congruent, example of heightening the scope of
review comes from Wilderness Society v. Tyrrel.141 In that decision, the court

136

“Regulations permitting hunting or fishing of fish and resident wildlife within the
System shall be, to the extent practicable, consistent with State fish and wildlife laws, regulations, and management plans.” 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(m). See supra discussion Part III.
137
Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1232.
138
Id. at 1240-41.
139
Id. at 1240 (quoting Sierra Club-Black Hills Group v. U.S. Forest Serv., 259 F.3d 1281,
1286 (10th Cir. 2001)).
140
Id. at 1240.
141
701 F. Supp. 1473, 1488-89 (E.D. Cal. 1988), rev’d, 918 F.2d 813 (9th Cir. 1990).
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enjoined a Forest Service timber sale based on a violation of one of the
savings clauses in the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act. The clause requires an
agency administering a segment of the wild and scenic rivers system to “cooperate with” state water pollution control agencies to diminish pollution.142
The California Department of Fish and Game, California Department of
Conservation, and an official from a regional water quality control board
all raised concerns about the effects of the proposed timber sale on water
quality. The Forest Service EIS dutifully included these critical comments,
but the agency ultimately dismissed them. Instead, the Forest Service
chose to rely on “best management practices” to reduce pollution from
logging.143 The resulting record of decision did not say anything other
than acknowledge lack of proof that the best management practices would
actually succeed in protecting water quality. This is reminiscent of the
FWS’s position in Wyoming that the state failed to prove the efficacy of the
brucellosis vaccine. Tyrrel found the record showed Forest Service consultation, but not cooperation, with the state.144 The key distinction for the
court was the necessity for the Forest Service to carry a heavier burden to
show why the state’s concerns were misplaced and why the state’s approach would not be the better option.145 Although the court of appeals overturned aspects of the district court decision, it did not upset the scrutinizing
interpretation of the savings clause.146
3.

Structural

If courts were to further strengthen the state’s position in applying
a savings clause, they might adopt a structural interpretation. This would
require the agency to have some framework in place for cooperative management. An example of such a framework is the BLM rule describing state
consistency,147 which was partly at issue in the Otero Mesa case.148 The
test of the structure’s adequacy would be whether there exists real
sharing of authority in a manner described by the savings clause. This
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16 U.S.C. § 1283(c) (1998).
Wilderness Soc’y, 701 F. Supp. at 1489.
144
Id. at 1476, 1488-91.
145
Id. at 1489.
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Wilderness Soc’y v. Tyrrel, 918 F.2d 813, 820 (9th Cir. 1990); Wilderness Soc’y v. Tyrrel,
53 F.3d 341 (9th Cir. 1995).
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See 43 C.F.R. § 1610.3-2 (2006).
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Richardson v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 459 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (2006). See supra notes
118-121 and accompanying text.
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interpretation is absent from the case reporters in part because the savings
clauses are so vague and enigmatic. A court employing a structural interpretation of a savings clause would have to overcome thirty years of
precedent hostile to judicial imposition of administrative requirements
that go beyond what the Administrative Procedure Act compels. Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council ended
the effort of the D.C. Circuit to impose additional administrative procedures where needed to fulfill the overarching goals of statutes.149 The
structural approach would revive the activist, pre-1978 tradition in the
name of federalism.
A structural approach would move beyond the reactive federalism
of simply responding to a state request and toward constructive federalism,
where partners together create a management regime. Place-based collaboration, such as management of the Valles Caldera, employs constructive
federalism through a structure for cooperation. Importantly, though, the
structure comes not from a savings clause, but from a detailed statutory
blueprint. In the end, a savings clause likely cannot serve as a firm enough
foundation for true structural federalism.
Judge Brimmer’s decisions overturning the Clinton Administration’s
rules protecting roadless areas in the national forests and prohibiting
snowmobile recreation in Yellowstone National Park, however, do approach
structural federalism by closely scrutinizing how agencies treat states in
the NEPA process.150 In preparing environmental impact statements under
NEPA, federal agencies follow the Council on Environmental Quality regulations, which establish a framework for the analysis. The regulations allow
federal agencies preparing an EIS to select a state agency affected by a proposed action or possessing special expertise to participate as a “cooperating
agency.”151 Cooperating agencies take on special projects in their area of expertise and work with the lead federal agency in conducting the analysis.152
In the snowmobile case, Judge Brimmer found that the lead agencies did
not sufficiently involve the cooperating state agencies in the development
of alternatives and did not delegate any meaningful duties to them.153 In
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See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
See Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 277 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1221 (D. Wyo. 2004), vacated,
414 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2005).
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40 C.F.R. § 1508.5 (2006).
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40 C.F.R. § 1501.6 (2006).
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Int’l Snowmobile Mfrs. Ass’n v. Norton, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1262 (D. Wyo. 2004); see
Record of Decision, Winter Use Plans for the Yellowstone and Grand Teton National Parks
and John D. Rockefeller Jr., Memorial Parkway, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,908, 80,916, 80,920 (Dec.
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the roadless rule case, Judge Brimmer found that the lead agency did not
sufficiently justify denying cooperating agency status to Wyoming.154 Both
decisions evince a deeper level of scrutiny of federal interaction with states
in the NEPA process and suggest a greater obligation to cooperate with
states than the statute or Council on Environmental Quality regulations
expressly provide.
C.

Conclusion

The abstract and broad language of savings clauses, especially
cooperative provisions, allow courts as well as agencies to see in them a
mirror of their own conceptions of cooperative federalism. Although courts
mostly continue to interpret the savings clauses using one of the three
weak approaches, recent cases illustrate the attraction of stronger interpretations. The three strong approaches give states an advantage in court
that they would not otherwise get. In particular, the Wyoming opinion on
vaccinating elk and the Brimmer decisions on the roadless rule and the
snowmobile ban in Yellowstone, show courts using statutory and regulatory
hooks of federalism to prompt federal reconsideration of state interests in
public land management. In the NER elk case, the court helped prompt
a comprehensive review in order to facilitate federal management more
responsive to state objectives. Is this the future of natural resources law
federalism? The next Part sets out to answer that question.
V.

PREDICTING THE FUTURE OF NATURAL RESOURCES LAW
FEDERALISM

Enlisting state and local interests to support federal aims has
been official policy at least since the New Deal, especially in watersheds
(basins).155 It has never been, however, a doctrine of legal purity. The political power driving federal natural resources policy prefers rhetorical
allegiance to state interests rather than binding commitments. Administrations and Congress have always picked and chosen compliant states
for deference and pushed aside states seeking competing objectives from
resource management.
22, 2000) (stating that state agencies were designated as cooperating agencies).
154
Wyoming, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 1221.
155
Symposium on Cooperative Federalism, 23 IOWA L. REV. 455 (1938); W. Brooke Graves,
Influence of Congressional Legislation on Legislation in the States, 23 IOWA. L. REV. 519,
536-37 (1938).
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In order to predict the future, one must first identify a trajectory
based on recent trends. This Part first discusses those trends, with
special focus on the Bush II Administration’s approach to pragmatic
federalism through “cooperative conservation.”156 It then ruminates on
the future of cooperative federalism in natural resources law.
A.

Recent Trends

On the surface, it can be difficult to discern any trends in natural
resources federalism because of its seeming contradictions. For instance,
compare the Bush II Administration’s response to Wyoming’s concerns
about brucellosis and elk populations in Jackson Hole157 with its response
to New Mexico’s concerns about the adverse effects of oil and gas development on wildlife on the Otero Mesa.158 Despite its “cooperative conservation” theme, the Bush II Administration denied New Mexico’s proposal
to restrict development on the Otero Mesa.159 The FLPMA state favoritism
provision requires the BLM to coordinate with state and local governments
in the development of land use plans “to the extent consistent with the laws
governing the administration of the public lands.”160 In 1998, BLM proposed drilling in a two million acre portion of the Chihuahuan Desert. This
included the 1.2 million acres of fragile grassland known as Otero Mesa.161
Otero Mesa is North America’s largest and wildest Chihuahuan Desert
grassland remaining on public lands.162 Governor Richardson requested
a “consistency review” of the BLM plan. Richardson argued that the BLM
plan conflicted with New Mexico law and state resource management
plans. He wanted to close 1.5 million acres to leasing and reserve 640,000
acres as National Conservation Areas. The BLM rejected this proposal on
the grounds that it was inconsistent with the agency’s fluid mineral policy
and executive orders directing agencies to expedite energy-related projects
on federal lands.163 The BLM plan instead opened all but 124,000 acres to
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Exec. Order No. 13,352, Facilitation of Cooperative Conservation, 69 Fed. Reg. 52,989
(Aug. 26, 2004).
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See supra notes 29-73 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 119-121 and accompanying text.
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Richardson v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 459 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1109 (D.N.M. 2006).
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43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(9) (2000).
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ENVIRONMENTAL WORKING GROUP, WHO OWNS THE WEST? OIL AND GAS LEASES IN
AMERICA’S WEST § 7 (2007), available at http://www.ewg.org/oil_and_gas/printerfriendly.php.
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development—including 36,000 acres of fragile grassland, four Wilderness
Study Areas, and six existing and eight proposed Areas of Critical Environmental Concern.164
The disparate treatment of states reflects a judgment about politics
and the priority of energy resource development. The Bush II Administration likely denied states their preferences with as much frequency as the
Clinton Administration. This is absolutely consistent with a long tradition
of selective use of federalism in natural resources policy. Like all administrations, the Bush II Administration found other state wildlife initiatives—
such as brucellosis vaccination on the National Elk Refuge—more palatable
to its centralized policy agenda. Although the two-term, recent era of the
Bush II Administration does not depart from historical patterns of pragmatic federalism, it does display three distinctive attributes: strong federalism rhetoric, innovative use of federalism tools, and a recession of national
interest in many environmental concerns.
The Bush II Administration hyped up the rhetoric of federalism
with great discipline and consistency. Interior Secretary Norton’s motto
of “the Four C’s—Communication, Consultation, and Cooperation all in
the service of Conservation”—became something of an incantation necessary to legitimize agency action within the department.165 This rhetoric
matured in the 2004 Executive Order promoting “cooperative conservation.”166 Both the Norton and presidential versions of cooperative conservation are considerably broader than federalism because they embrace direct
federal partnerships with landowners, businesses, and non-governmental
organizations. Federalism historically embraces the relationships between the United States and tribes, states, or local government units.167
The federalism discourse, including its suggestions of devolution,
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Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Bureau of Land Mgmt., BLM Issues Plan for
Limited, Environmentally Sensitive Oil and Gas Development in Otero and Sierra Counties
(Jan. 24, 2005), available at http://www.nm.blm.gov/news_releases/NR_2005/012105-OteroNR.pdf. The BLM contends that the adopted plan is already sufficiently restrictive. The
BLM regulates and monitors development, and less than one tenth of one percent of the
total land area is open to maximum surface disturbance. The plan also includes reclamation
requirements which must be satisfied before new development activities may begin. Id.
165
E.g., Gail Norton, Secretary of the Interior, Address at the National Press Club (Feb. 20,
2002), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/020225.html.
166
Exec. Order No. 13,352, 69 Fed. Reg. 52,989 (Aug. 26, 2004).
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But see Robert D. Comer, Cooperative Conservation: The Federalism Underpinnings
to Public Involvement in the Management of Public Lands, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 1133, 1135
(2004) (using “the term ‘cooperative federalism’ to identify the constitutional authority for
cooperative conservation, or the sharing of federal authority with nonfederal entities in the
management of public lands”).
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downsizing, and outsourcing, provides a flavor of the policies favored by
the Administration.
The Bush II Administration has pushed some innovation of federalism tools. The 2005 roadless rule, while not without precedent, nonetheless
established a high-profile template for managing federal conservation
systems in accordance with principles that vary by state preference.168
Instead of the promulgation of a single, uniform national standard, the
Bush rule allowed localized decision-making through the state petition
process. If the Agriculture Secretary accepted a state petition, the USDA
and the state were to cooperate in a state-specific rulemaking subject to
public review and NEPA analysis. If the state failed to submit a petition or
the USDA rejected a petition, the management plans of each forest would
govern the roadless areas.169 Another example of novel federalism is a 2006
FWS policy for managing the national wildlife refuge system that extends
to certain state actions the umbrella immunity of “refuge management
activities,” a category exempt from both the compatibility and appropriateness analyses that are otherwise necessary before approving an activity
on a refuge.170 By addressing the issue in a memorandum of understanding
between a state wildlife agency and a FWS regional office, a document that
is not subject to any particular public oversight or participation, state game
management may be deputized as national wildlife refuge management.
Programs such as predator control, or even hunting rules, may circumvent
the public hearing and environmental analysis otherwise used to vet activities to ensure they fulfill the proper national objectives. Both examples
employ state favoritism without establishing criteria for adopting the state
position. They also involve purely administrative initiatives, eschewing
legislative reform.
The third distinctive trend arises from what a water lawyer might
call the “reliction” of national interest in many environmental concerns.171
As federal leadership recedes, states may enter to fill the void. States have
a newfound assertiveness in regulating the environmental impacts of
public land mineral development—especially the effects of drilling on split
168

See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
Dan Berman, Roadless Rule’s Repeal Spurs a New Round of Battles, GREENWIRE, May 6,
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estates and wildlife—as the federal government has tilted toward favoring production as a preeminent goal.172 More well-known are the state
and multi-state initiatives to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases such
as carbon dioxide.173 It is important to note, however, that federalism is not
a zero-sum game. States may aggressively assert control over even those
aspects of natural resources management for which the federal government retains an active engagement. Most statutes preempt only certain or
weaker kinds of state rules, not the entire field. Conversely, recession of
federal leadership does not necessarily mean that states will expand their
interest. The simultaneous retreat from noise control in the 1970s reflected
decisions at both the state and national levels that the issues did not merit
close attention.174
B.

Predictions for Cooperative Federalism

A uniformitarian approach to predicting the future of federalism
assumes that the trends discussed above would continue into the foreseeable future. This stands in contrast to catastrophism, which postulates that
disruptive changes fundamentally reorient the course of the future. The
concept of uniformitarianism was promoted in the 18th century by James
Hutton, the founder of modern geological science.175 Uniformitarianism in
geology postulates that the Earth’s history can be understood by studying
the geologic processes at work today. The principle that the geologic past
operated under the same laws and conditions as are currently observed
helped displace biblical flood theories.176 The future of federalism under
uniformitarianism would mean:
1)
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continued proliferation of diverse but weak federal
invitations for state participation in natural resources decision-making;
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steady rise in state sophistication and assertiveness
on natural resources issues; and
more frequent treatment of tribes as states for
cooperative federalism purposes.

Looming over such a prediction of steady movement in the current
direction, however, is the prospect of abrupt shifts in natural resources law
to adapt to climate change. Already resource managers face daunting challenges from sea level rise, asynchronous modification of migratory habitat,
and warming of the high latitudes.177 The next few decades promise more
significant disruptions to business-as-usual in natural resources law. The
phenomenon of climate change may well upset the uniformitarian assumptions. Catastrophism would then be a better guide to predicting the future
of cooperative federalism, but there is little certainty in what that would
mean. It seems clear that the next president, whoever s/he is, will respond
to climate change with more assertiveness than prior administrations. Most
commentators stress that adaptation will require larger spatial and longer
temporal scales for resource management.178 This suggests that the federal
government may assert a more dominant role in natural resources law
simply because larger scales demand more cross-boundary thinking. On
the other hand, coordination, through such vehicles as watershed or ecosystem management, requires closer cooperation with tribal, state, and
local jurisdictions that control land use, water consumption, and wildlife
conservation.
Although the imperatives of climate change may necessarily prompt
more cooperative federalism, the history of prognostication counsels caution
when projecting an imminent golden era of good feelings. For decades, commentators have cited place-based collaborations as the flourishing future
of resource management.179 While the tools for such efforts have certainly
177
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improved in the past quarter century, they have not significantly altered
the national direction of natural resources law. Increasingly, skeptics like
Professor Glicksman have documented ways in which cooperative federalism has faltered.180
The prediction for which we have the most confidence is that money
will continue to drive federalism efforts. Money is an engine for intergovernmental relations in two respects. First, as a matter of equity, the federal
government owes an obligation to state and local governments that carry
disproportionate burdens of public land policy. The perpetual negotiations
over payments in lieu of taxes, and especially funding for local schools,
indicate how much respect the federal government has for outstanding
promises to sustain communities that miss out on property tax revenue due
to federal resource management policy. It is unrealistic to expect local communities to cooperate with federal objectives without federal appropriation
of a fair return to those jurisdictions that face special burdens because of
United States tax immunity.
Second, and more pervasively, money is the key inducement for
states to cooperate with federal policy priorities. Whether conservation
grants for wildlife conservation plans, appropriations for pollution abatement programs, or specific earmarks for place-based collaborations—such
as the CALFED project181 in the Sacramento River Delta—money greases
the skids for participation, compromise, and concluding negotiations in
program development. When the federal government promises significant
funding for implementation, a cooperative effort is far more likely than
when the government offers little more than recognition.
Federalism’s asymmetry is an important attribute of its fascination
and complexity in natural resources law. Federal and state legal activity
may act in tandem, in opposition, or independently of each other.182 Increased federal involvement in, for example, oil and gas development does
not necessarily displace state law—it may in fact prompt increased local
regulation.183 Also, states are not miniature versions of the federal gov
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ernment. The inherent, sovereign police powers that undergird state regulation of land, water, and wildlife differ significantly from the constitutional
powers of Congress to regulate interstate commerce and make rules to
manage federal property. Moreover, Congress does not act independently
from states. Congress, especially the Senate, itself comprises state delegations. Particularly in public land management, affected state congressional
delegations have an enormous influence on federal programs focused on
particular land units. These essential differences establish the comparative
advantages that promise continued potential for improved resource management through cooperation. Shifts in politics are not likely to dramatically change this fundamental differentiation. Although natural resources
federalism is cloaked in rhetoric, its vital center remains rooted in law.
CONCLUSION
Savings clauses link the federalism proclaimed in statutes with the
actual cooperation observed in resource management. Judicial interpretation of a savings clause may elevate or undermine the importance of state
interests in federal natural resources programs. Largely, it is the interpretive approach used by a court that determines whether an ambiguous
savings clause will compel special consideration not otherwise required
under federal law.
Although the judiciary places the interpretive fulcrum establishing
how much leverage states can expect in federal decision-making, administrative policies have and will play the dominant role in shaping cooperative
federalism. Administrative initiatives directly addressing state-federal
relations will continue to spur innovation and variation over time. History
teaches, however, that substantive federal natural resources policy plays
a more central role in determining the level of cooperation with states than
does the federalism rhetoric. State-supported winter elk feeding and vaccination at the National Elk Refuge will therefore continue until the federal
government decides that broad environmental concerns or disease risks
demand a new course of action. When that happens, cooperative federalism
and savings clauses will shape the process more than the outcome.

to federal oil and gas leasing).

